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WATER LAWREVIEW
whether the recent change to the historic decree extinguished any right to divert
water from the ditch. The status of the easement also depended upon this de-
tenriination, as its existence hinged on the scope of the underlying water right.
While the parties to this case disagreed as to whether the 2014 decree elim-
inated any right to divert water from the old ditch, both parties agreed that the
viability of K-LOW's trespass claim turned upon whether it retained a water
right to the ditch after the 2014 change.
The water court looked to the plain language of the 2014 decree and held
that the water right allowed its holder to divert water only at the pump downriver
from the headgate and disputed ditch. The court further held that the decree
did not include a right to divert water from that ditch, thus granting Select's
partial motion for summary judgment. K-LOW appealed.
The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the water court's findings. The
Court explained that a water decree does not confer a water right: it merely
confirms its existence, recogizes its scope, and governs its administration. Any
asserted right, to include any claimed alternate diversion points, must appear
on the face of the decree or result from the proper construction of its provisions.
The Court thereby looked to the plain language of the 2014 decree and found
that whether there was a right to divert the water was unambiguous: the decree
did not grant a right to divert from the SD&SD.
K-LOW argued that the court should recognize alternate points of diver-
sion and, therefore, a right to divert from the ditch, based on the 1914 adjudi-
cation of the "Plumb Drain ditch and other accretions" as additional sources of
supply. Looking again to the plain language of the decree, the Court found that
though the decree identifies these additional sources, it does not identify alter-
nate points of diversion for them. Instead, the decree clearly recognizes a single
point of diversion-that of the downstream pump-as well as the sources of sup-
ply available to that point of diversion. The Court agreed with the water court's
deternination that, assuming all of the sources of supply returned to the South
Platte River above the new diversion point, then all original sources of the
SD&SD would be available at the new location. Thus, no independent right
remained to divert seepage, waste waters, or accretions from anywhere besides
the new diversion point, and accordingly no right existed to divert water from
the SD&SD.
Accordingly, the Court affinned the water court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of Select Energy Services.
Megan McCuloch
MONTANA
City of Helena v. Cmty. of Rimini, 397 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2017) (holding that,
despite a period of non-use, a presumption of nonabandonment of a water right
that comported with the great and growing cities doctrine, applied to a munici-
pality when the city proved intent to use its entire water right in the future by
constructing a conveyance with the capacity to utilize the city's water right com-
pletely).
junior water right holder Andy R. Skinner and the Community of Rimini
objected to the City of Helena's (the "City") claim to 13.75 cubic feet per second
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of water from Tenmile Creek in Helena, Montana. The City's water right de-
cree dates back to 1903. In 2011, the Water Master found that the City aban-
doned 7.35 cfs of its water right and imposed a specific place of use restriction
on the City's water rights. The City filed objections and in 2013, the water court
restored the City's water rights in full, but adopted the Water Master's specific
place of use restriction. Skinner appealed. The Montana Supreme Court re-
manded for further proceedings. On remand, the water court ruled that the
City had abandoned 0.60 cfs of its water rights. Once again, Skinner appealed.
The legislature amended M.C.A. section 85-2-227 in 2005 to create a pre-
sumption of nonabandonment for water rights claimed for municipal use by a
city when the city meets any of four criteria, one being the construction and
maintenance of a diversion or conveyance structure. Skinner argued that, under
M.C.A. section 1-2-109, the statute could not be applied retroactively because
the statute does not expressly declare so. The Court upheld the water court's
finding that the 2005 amendment o M.C.A. section 85-2-227 was a change in
the burden of proof, which was a procedural change in law rather than a sub-
stantive one. Therefore, the presumption of nonabandonment of a water right
applied to the City, so long as the City met the requirements of the statute.
Abandonment of a water right typically requires both non-use and intent to
abandon. However, under M.C.A. section 85-2-227, the City would benefit
from a presumption that it did not abandon its water right, despite any period
of non-use, if the City used any part of its water right while showing an intention
to plan for future growth. Constructing a diversion or conveyance structure,
conducting a formal study, or maintaining a facility connected to the municipal
water supply system for emergency purposes evidenced intent to plan for future
growth. The Montana statute comports with the purpose of the great and grow-
ing cities doctrine, a doctrine that originated from the Colorado Supreme
Court. The doctrine arose in response to growing urban populations to ensure
an adequate water supply to the public. The policy behind the great and grow-
ing cities doctrine is that cities cannot survive without acquiring more water and
should therefore receive different treatment than private individuals. The Col-
orado Supreme Court emphasized the importance of cities' ability to obtain
appropriations of water that will satisfy the needs of the city, especially resulting
from a normal increase in population within a reasonable amount of time.
The Court upheld the water court's finding that the City showed intent to
use its water right in the future. The City created a presumption of nonaban-
donment by constructing a concrete diversion pipeline with a capacity of 13.15
cfs in 1921, commissioning an engineering report in 1929, and maintaining an
open channel ditch for emergency municipal water supply. Although the 1921
conveyance, called the Rimini Pipeline, did not have the capacity to transport
the City's entire water right (13.75 cfs), the Court held that the City did not
intend to abandon the unused 0.60 cfs. The 1929 engineering report revealed
that friction, leakage, waste, and other factors were restricting the capacity of the
City's two smaller transmission pipelines. The report qualified as a formal study
evidencing the City's intention to accommodate for its future needs. In 1948,
the City constructed a new pipeline with the capacity to convey the City's entire
water right of 13.75 cfs.
Skinner contended that the City's period of non-use between 1948 and
2011 was sufficient to rebut the presumption of nonabandonment. The water
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court agreed with the Water Master's finding that the City did not present evi-
dence that it intended to increase the Rimini Pipeline's capacity from 13.15 cfs
to the full water right capacity of 13.75 cfs. Although the 1948 conveyance had
the capacity of 13.75 cfs, the Rimini Pipeline was restricting the new pipeline's
water flow to 13.15 cfs. Skinner argued that the beneficial use requirement
limits the City's water right to the amount of water actually used for a beneficial
use. The water court held that the City did not present sufficient evidence to
show intention to increase its diversion capacity to the full extent of the water
right. The Court held the water court erred in upholding the Water Master's
determination because the City took affirmative steps towards planning for the
City's future water needs. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting
a city's efforts to substantially utilize its water rights. The City met the statutory
criteria for the presumption of nonabandonment of its water right as applied to
the City's entire system of conveyances, including all pipelines. The Court held
that despite the period of non-use, the City's construction of the 13.75 cfs ca-
pacity pipeline permitted an inference that the City sought to make use of its
entire water right.
Montana law requires a final water right decree to include a place of use
restriction. The statute for this place of use element is constitutionally pro-
tected. The City challenged the restriction, but failed procedurally to comply
with the notice requirement when challenging a constitutionally protected stat-
ute.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's opinion that the pre-
sumption of nonabandonment applied to the City, reversed the water court's
detenination that the City abandoned 0.60 cfs of its water right, and remanded
for the entry of an amended judgment awarding the City its entire 13.75 cfs
water right in Tenmile Creek.
Justice Jim Rice, dissenting.
Justice Rice did not agree with the Court's finding that M.C.A. section 85-
2-227 could be applied retroactively because the 2005 amendment o the statute
was procedural. He argued the amendment was in fact substantive because the
statute, as applied, produced a different legal result from the result that would
have followed had the presumption of nonabandonment not been applied. He
found the sixty year period of non-use by the City unfair to Skinner's claim,
especially considering Skinner's four water rights dating back to 1865.
Kate Mailliard
NEBRASKA
Hill v. State, 894 N.W.2d 208 (Neb. 2017) (holding that: (i) an interstate
compact is federal law and supersedes water appropriators' property interests;
(ii) regulatory actions that limit water rights to ensure compliance with an inter-
state compact do not represent a physical permanent invasion; (iii) regulatory
actions that limited water rights did not deprive farmers of all economically ben-
eficial use of their property; and (iv) a state agency department's failure to curtail
groundwater pumping does not result in a taking when the department has no
jurisdiction to regulate groundwater).
The Republican River Compact ("the Compact") apportions Colorado,
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